Trump’s East Asia policy is incoherent

As President Trump’s tariff announcements dominated headlines last week, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was undertaking the more routine version of what is grandly termed “defense diplomacy.” He traveled to the Philippines and Japan, having first visited the headquarters of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii and the strategically vital bomber station at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.

After what most people would have regarded as the profound public humiliation of the Signal group chat leak, Hegseth was on more predictable and scripted territory, but his mission was important. He was seeking to reassure America’s allies in the Pacific that, even if the Trump administration is less interested in events in Europe, its commitment to containing China and supporting America’s regional security partners remains a central part of its security policy.

In Manila, Hegseth met President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and the secretary of national defense and announced that the U.S. was not only steadfast in its commitment to the Philippines, but would deploy additional assets and increase training, industrial and cyber cooperation. This includes providing the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System anti-ship missiles for the annual Exercise Balikatan in April and May.

When he reached Japan, there were more plans and commitments. Hegseth seemingly cannot last the duration of a media event without talking about “warfighting” or “the warrior ethos.” It is an oddly pleading obsession with crude displays of machismo, but it was the context in which he made his announcements.

U.S. Forces Japan, the 55,000 personnel deployed at 15 major bases around the home islands, will be upgraded. What is currently a subordinate unified command with mainly administrative functions will be transformed into a joint force headquarters. This will give it more operational and, yes, warfighting responsibilities, making it better able to react in a crisis. The new organization will also work more closely in cooperation with Japan’s new Joint Operations Command, set up only weeks ago as a stronger central authority, which commands the three branches of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (ground, maritime and air).

There are two striking features about all of these changes and reorganizations. The first is that they are definite indicators of an intention to maintain America’s military reach in the Pacific, strengthening and streamlining the way the U.S. military will operate and interact with allies. This stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s tetchy thinking-out-loud in March, when he reflected that the current security arrangements meant that America “has to protect Japan,” but “they don’t have to protect us,” asking rhetorically, “Who makes these deals?”

The second element worth observing is that these policies represent continuity, the ongoing fulfilment of promises made during the Biden administration. The Trump narrative depicts the years between 2021 and 2025 as the valley of the shadow of death, the fons et origo of every problem now facing America. Yet it was Biden who agreed to help the Philippines upgrade its military capability, and Biden who announced the upgrading of U.S. Forces Japan.

This should be encouraging. Trump is the embodiment of an unreliable friend, so public commitments to Manila and Tokyo are a positive sign, reinforcing the mutual security agreements the U.S. made with the Philippines in 1951 and Japan in 1960. The reemergence of Japan as a major factor in regional security is especially welcome. I wrote here in December 2023 that “over the last 10 years, Japan has quietly transformed its military capability and stance” and “bluntly … the West needs Japan.”

Yet when “Liberation Day,” as Trump inexplicably billed April 2, arrived and his beloved tariff system was unveiled, Japan found itself subject to an across-the-board levy of 24 percent. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba admitted “we are extremely disappointed and regret that such measures have been implemented”; he intends to ask for them to be reviewed, but accepts results “will not come overnight” — although Trump soon announced a 90-day pause in the levies after global stock markets tanked.

In comparison, the Philippines was treated generously, with only a 17 percent tariff, but two other vital regional allies had hefty penalties applied: Taiwan at 32 percent and South Korea at 25 percent.

The tariff regime makes no sense in any event, calculated on an elaborate formula that betrays either mendacity or a failure to understand basic economics. Taken on its own terms, however, it is a catastrophically contradictory counterpart to the painstaking East Asian security agreements, not just threatening the prosperity of supposedly close allies but causing regional and global economic disruption. Trump has presented his friends with lifebelts, then summoned Poseidon to raise a storm.

Trump seems to relish the potential benefits of the largely discredited “madman theory,” that he gains an advantage through sheer unpredictability. But it is hard to see how allies are expected to react, with near-bipartisan decisions on military deployments meeting impulsive and damaging economic policy.

Strengthening ties with Japan and the Philippines is good, but they are America’s friends. Washington should not seek to make life unnecessarily difficult for them, or else what are alliances worth?

Eliot Wilson is a freelance writer on politics and international affairs and the co-founder of Pivot Point Group. He was senior official in the U.K. House of Commons from 2005 to 2016, including serving as a clerk of the Defence Committee and secretary of the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.