Rubio’s revolutionary downsizing of America’s global role

Secretary of State Marco Rubio is implementing a fundamental shift in America’s global role. In a recent lengthy interview with Megyn Kelly, Rubio argued that the mission of making America great again does not mean returning the U.S. to the pinnacle of the world order. The effort of trying to be the world’s “parent” has distracted the U.S. from pursuing its own national interests.

As Rubio put it, other countries have “gotten used to a foreign policy in which you act in the national interest of your country and we [the U.S.] sort of act in the interest of the globe or the global order. But we’re led by a different kind of person now, and under President Trump we’re going to do what you do.”

America will henceforth be the eldest sibling among rival sovereign states, not the selfless world parent.

The elimination of American foreign assistance via Elon Musk’s chainsaw surgery on the U.S. Agency for International Development is thus not simply a streamlining or cost-cutting measure; it marks a realignment of national purpose.

Rubio pointed out that “the U.S. government is not a charity. It spends money on behalf of our national interest.” In the aftermath of World War II, Americans got used to being in charge of the free world’s weal and woe. With the end of the Cold War, the sense of global responsibility was enhanced and enlarged. “Because we were the only power in the world,” Rubio said, “we assumed this responsibility of sort of becoming the global government in many cases, trying to solve every problem.”

Now, Rubio said, the U.S. will act as other countries do: “The way the world has always worked is that the Chinese will do what’s in the best interests of China, the Russians will do what’s in the best interest of Russia, the Chileans are going to do what’s in the best interest of Chile and the United States needs to do what’s in the best interest of the United States. Where our interests align, that’s where you have partnerships and alliances; where our differences are not aligned, that is where the job of diplomacy is to prevent conflict while still furthering our national interests and understanding they’re going to further theirs.”

This is not President Joe Biden’s world of allies versus bad guys. Here it’s all just guys pursuing their own interests in a game of all against all. It is national individualism — maximizing every transaction — not isolationism.

Rather than being the dealer in the international order, the U.S. will hold the best cards in the international game. If it plays its hand well, it will become great again. World order is seen as a pattern of international interaction, with each country pursuing its own interests.

Rubio’s rationale ties together Trump administration actions as disparate as trade wars, compromising with Russia in Ukraine, pressuring NATO, dropping out of the World Health Organization and threatening to take over Greenland. With Rubio’s explanation, these acts are not isolated and arbitrary, but revolutionary.

All revolutions have two basic problems. First, the old order comprises a complex array of habits and prospects. In recent years, the liberal global order has eroded, but it remains the familiar pattern of reference. Without a world “parent,” however flawed, who knows what to expect over the next five years, or even the next year?

The second problem is that revolutions typically focus on one key problem of the current order and then get blindsided by unanticipated crises. Trump and Rubio are aware of the deterioration of America’s global standing; hence the “again” in MAGA. But a leap to rogue individualism by the central power on the world stage will not solve as many problems as it creates.

A transactional revolution in American foreign policy is likely to lead to a global cascade of races to the bottom in terms of security, reducing risks and economic welfare. The unseen hand of individual advantage requires a visible body of common expectations, and that will be the revolution’s first victim.

Brantly Womack is emeritus professor of foreign affairs and a senior faculty fellow at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs.